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Epistemic Beliefs and Prior Knowledge as Predictors of the 
Construction of Different Types of Arguments on Socio-Scientific Issues 
Andreani Baytelman, Kalypso Iordanou and Costas. P. Constantinou 
Abstract 
This study investigates whether university students' epistemic beliefs and prior knowledge about 
controversial socio-scientific issues (SSIs) can predict the different types of arguments that 
students construct. Two hundred forty-three university students were asked to construct different 
types of supportive arguments - social, ethical, economic, scientific, ecological - as well as 
counterarguments and rebuttals after they had read a scenario on a SSI. Participants’ epistemic 
beliefs and prior knowledge were assessed separately. Results showed that students' epistemic 
beliefs and prior knowledge predicted the quantity, quality and diversity of the different types of 
arguments the students construct. In particular, students who held sophisticated epistemic beliefs 
about the structure of knowledge and exhibited relatively more robust  prior knowledge scores 
produced arguments of greater quantity, better quality and higher diversity of argument types 
than students with less sophisticated epistemic beliefs and low prior knowledge scores. 
Educational implications are discussed. 
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The construction of arguments is an essential feature of scientific reasoning and an integral 
component of scientific literacy (Duschl, 2008; Erduran & Jimenez-Aleixandre, 2007; Kuhn, 
Iordanou, Pease, & Wirkala, 2008; NGSS Lead States, 2013; Yacoubian, 2018). Skilled 
argumentation entails not only the presentation of one’s own position, but also consideration and 
evaluation of alternatives (Mason & Scirica, 2006). Argumentation plays therefore a prominent 
role in efforts to grapple with controversial socio-scientific issues (SSIs), defined as open-ended, 
debatable, complex or ill-structured problems that require the consideration of social, ethical, 
economic, scientific, ecological  perspectives (Dawson & Venville, 2013; Sadler, 2009; Sadler 
& Zeidler, 2005). Prior research has demonstrated that individuals’ argument skills do not 
develop spontaneously. Yet the factors that facilitate the development of argument skills remains 
underdetermined, including when people engage in SSI (Asterhan & Schwarz, 2016; Henderson, 
McNeill, González‐Howard, Close, & Evans, 2018; Iordanou & Constantinou, 2014; 2015; 
Zeidler, Herman, & Sadler, 2019). To gain a fuller understanding of how argument skills develop, 
it has been suggested that we could pay closer attention to learners’ epistemic thinking and its 
possible interaction with students’ argument skills (Barzilai & Chinn, 2018; Iordanou, 2016a; 
Kuhn, Zillmer, Crowell & Zavala, 2013). 
Our aim in this study is to investigate whether individuals’ epistemic beliefs and prior 
knowledge about controversial socio-scientific issues (SSIs) can predict students’ argument 
skills. We are also interested in examining the effect of context on argument skills. The question 
of whether and to what extent argument skills are context specific is still an open one, given that 
there are mixed findings regarding the transferability of argument skill from one context to 
another (Iordanou, 2010; Osborne et al., 2016; Udell, 2007). In particular, the study investigates 
whether prior knowledge, epistemic beliefs and SSI-context predict the quantity, quality and 
diversity of different types of arguments constructed by university students on a complex, 
controversial, socio-scientific topic. By doing this, we hope to contribute to the development of 
a theoretical framework that will describe the relationship between epistemic beliefs, prior 
knowledge and construction of arguments on SSIs.  
Conceptualization of Epistemic Beliefs 
Epistemic beliefs refer to individuals’ beliefs about the nature of knowledge and the 
process through which  knowledge develops (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; Muis, Pekrun, Sinatra et 
al., 2015; Sandoval, Greene, & Bråten, 2016). According to Kitchener (2002), “epistemology” is 
a theory of knowledge and how it develops, while “personal epistemology” is a personal theory 
about developing knowledge.  
Different models have been proposed on how to conceptualize and examine epistemic 
beliefs. Perry (1970) proposed a developmental model that described nine levels in epistemic 
beliefs, ranging from the belief that knowledge is objective, to the belief that knowledge is 
radically subjective, and finally to the belief that knowledge has objective and subjective aspects. 
Based on Perry's scheme, Kuhn and colleagues (e.g. Kuhn, 1991; Kuhn et al., 2000) developed 
a framework for the development of epistemic beliefs, which progresses along three general 
epistemic levels: absolutist, multiplist, and evaluativist. Absolutists view knowledge as 
comprising certain and absolute facts and expertise as the basis for knowing. Absolutists express 
high certainty about their own beliefs. Multiplists are skeptical about expertise, emphasizing that 
experts disagree with each other and are inconsistent over time. Evaluativists deny the possibility 
of certain knowledge, and acknowledge that viewpoints can be compared and evaluated to assess 
relative merits. These positions are considered developmental, rather than variants of cognitive 
style (Iordanou, 2016a; Kuhn et al., 2000). 
Another model, the multidimensional approach, proposed that epistemic beliefs should 
be described as a system of more or less independent beliefs (epistemic dimensions), 
conceptualized as beliefs about the certainty (related with the stability of knowledge), simplicity 
(related with the structure of knowledge), and source of knowledge, as well as beliefs about the 
speed and ability of knowledge acquisition (Schommer, 1990; Schommer, Crouse, & Rhodes 
1992; Schommer-Aikins, 2004). While the dimensions of certainty, simplicity and source in 
Schommer’s conceptualization fall under the more generally accepted definition of epistemic 
beliefs - known as beliefs about the nature of knowledge (certainty, simplicity) and knowing 
(source) (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997) - the speed and ability dimensions are controversial because 
they mainly concern beliefs about learning (speed) and intelligence (ability). Hofer and Pintrich 
(1997) argued that epistemic beliefs should be defined more purely, with two dimensions 
concerning the nature of knowledge (what one believes knowledge is) and two dimensions 
concerning the nature or process of knowing (how one comes to know). According to Hofer and 
Pintrich (1997), the two dimensions concerning the nature of knowledge are: (a) Simplicity of 
Knowledge, ranging from the belief that knowledge consists of an accumulation of more or less 
isolated facts to the belief that knowledge consists of highly interrelated concepts; and (b) 
Certainty of Knowledge, ranging from the belief that knowledge is absolute and unchanging, to 
the belief that knowledge is tentative and evolving. The two dimensions concerning the nature 
of knowing are: (c) Source of Knowledge, ranging from the conception that knowledge originates 
outside the self and resides in external authority from which it may be transmitted, to the 
conception that knowledge is actively constructed by the person in interaction with others; and, 
(d) Justification for Knowing, ranging from justification of knowledge claims through 
observation and authority or on the basis of what feels right, to the use of rules of inquiry and the 
evaluation and integration of different sources (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). Accordingly, Hofer and 
Pintrich´s model differs from Schommer’s in that it omits the nature of learning factors and adds 
another nature of knowing factor, namely justification. Additionally, Conley and colleagues 
(2004) suggested a new factor under the nature of knowledge factors, the Development of 
Knowledge.  
Despite the differences between the developmental and the multidimensional models, 
Pintrich (2002) acknowledged that, although the endpoint of development of epistemic beliefs 
varies from model to model, “the fairly well-established trend is that individuals move from some 
more objectivist perspective through a relativistic one, to a more balanced and reasoned 
perspective on the objectivist–relativistic continuum, with this latter position reflecting a more 
sophisticated manner of thinking” (Pintrich, 2002, p. 400).  
Epistemic Beliefs and Argument Skills  
According to Kuhn’s (2001) theoretical model, epistemic beliefs support argument skills. 
In particular, epistemic beliefs inform intellectual values that deal with questions such as “Is 
there a point to arguing?” and intellectual values, in turn, affect the disposition to apply 
argumentation strategies. Yet, according to Mason and Scirica (2006), argument skills may 
indeed be enhanced or constrained by epistemic beliefs, that is, by more or less advanced 
representations about the nature, source, justification, validation, and appropriation of 
knowledge. 
The relationship between epistemic beliefs and argument skills has been the focus of 
several studies over the past thirty years (Barzilai & Eshet-Alkalai, 2015; Bell & Linn, 2000; 
Berland et al., 2016; Duschl, 2008; Henderson et al., 2018; Iordanou, 2016b; Mason & Scirica, 
2006;  Nussbaum, Sinatra & Poliquin, 2008; Wu & Tsai, 2011; Xiao & Sandoval, 2016). These 
studies report remarkably consistent findings, despite variation with respect to the epistemic 
beliefs framework the studies employ and the instruments they use to assess epistemic beliefs. In 
particular, a relationship has been found between advanced epistemic beliefs, evaluativist beliefs, 
and individuals’ ability to generate alternative arguments and counterarguments (Iordanou, 
2016b; Iordanou & Constantinou, 2015; Kuhn, 1991; Mason & Scirica, 2006; Zavala & Kuhn, 
2017). In addition, a relationship has been reported between evaluativist epistemic beliefs and 
comprehension and evaluation of arguments, during reading (Barzilai & Eshet-Alkalai, 2015; 
Iordanou, Muis, & Kendeou, 2019). 
Even though previous empirical studies have revealed that there is a relationship between 
individuals’ epistemic beliefs and the number and/or the quality of socio-scientific arguments, 
counterarguments, and rebuttals that they produced, the possible contribution of epistemic beliefs 
to the diversity of different types of arguments that individuals produce has not yet been 
investigated. In the present study we address this gap in the literature, namely whether epistemic 
beliefs and prior knowledge predict construction of different types of arguments. 
Furthermore, previous research suggests that epistemic beliefs may limit or promote 
conceptual change and topic conceptual understanding (Amin, Smith & Wiser, 2014; 
Stathopoulou & Vosniadou, 2007a; 2007b; Trevors, Kendeou, Bråten, & Braasch, 2017a), which 
means that the investigation of the interrelationship of epistemic beliefs, topic conceptual 
understanding and argumentations skills is an important research issue. 
Prior Knowledge and Argument Skills 
According to Toulmin (1972), argumentation is intertwined with reasoning and critical 
thinking and is the mechanism for creating and using knowledge (Willard, 1989). Researchers also 
highlight that domain-specific knowledge has a critical role in scientific reasoning, and that well-
structured knowledge can sustain higher levels of reasoning than poorly structured knowledge 
(Amin, Smith & Wiser, 2014; Carey, 1985; Chinn & Duncan, 2018; Koslowski, 1996; Osborne et 
al., 2016; Osborne, & Simon, 2008; Schauble, 1996; Stathopoulou & Vosniadou, 2007a; 2007b; 
Trevors, Kendeou, Bråten, & Braasch, 2017; Von Aufschnaiter et al., 2008). Yet, our 
understanding of how prior-knowledge contributes to argumentation skills is still not clear 
(Grooms, Sampson, & Enderle, 2018). For example, some researchers support that sufficient prior 
knowledge is a prerequisite for engagement in argumentation (Sadler & Fowler, 2006; Sadler & 
Zeidler, 2005; Von Aufschnaiter et al., 2008), while others support that prior knowledge  alone 
does not determine the quality of argument skills, supporting that topic knowledge is probably a 
necessary, but not a sufficient condition for skilled scientific argumentation (Iordanou & 
Constantinou, 2015; Kuhn, 1991; Means and Voss, 1996).  
Furthermore, previous research that examined the relation between prior knowledge and 
argument skills, has focused on how prior knowledge affects the quantity and quality of 
arguments. Yet, the possible relation between prior knowledge and the diversity of different types 
of arguments produced has not been examined. The present work addresses this gap in the 
literature by examining the possible relation between prior knowledge and all the different 
measures of argument skills, namely quantity, quality and diversity of arguments produced.  
 
The Present Study 
In the present study, we extend the literature by investigating whether university students' 
epistemic beliefs and prior knowledge about controversial socio-scientific issues (SSIs) predict 
the quantity, the quality and the diversity of the different types of arguments that students 
construct. We investigate different types of arguments such as social, ethical, economic, 
scientific and ecological because the three SSIs chosen for this study ‒ Vaccination or not against 
the NUEVO flu virus, Consumption of bottled vs. tap water, Usage of underground vs. overhead 
high voltage lines in residential areas ‒ involve phenomena which have societal, ethical, 
economic, scientific and ecological aspects. A similar classification was used by Wu and Tsai 
(2011), who also investigated the relationship among students’ epistemic beliefs and their 
informal reasoning on nuclear power usage.  
In particular, we set out to answer two research questions:  
(1) What is the relationship between university students’ prior knowledge and epistemic 
beliefs and the number, quality and diversity of arguments they construct on a controversial 
socio-scientific topic?  
(2) What is the relationship between the socio-scientific topic context experienced by 
students and the number, quality and diversity of the arguments that they construct about a 
controversial socio-scientific topic?  
We focus on the construction of different types of arguments because the ability to 
produce arguments that integrate multiple positions or accounts reflects one’s depth of reasoning 
(Nussbaum & Schraw, 2007). Also, the ability to consider a variety of perspectives is 
fundamental for decision-making, especially in the case of SSIs, which are complex, open-ended 
problems which involve controversial and conflicting information (Herman, Zeidler, & Newton, 
2018; . Lee, Lee, & Zeidler, 2019; Lindahl, Folkesson, & Zeidler, 2019; Zeidler, 2014). Although 
previous research has shown that there is a relationship between sophisticated epistemic beliefs 
and argumentation skills, in terms of the number of arguments produced about an issue (Mason 
& Scirica, 2006; Songer & Linn, 1992; Wu & Tsai, 2011) and the quality of arguments produced 
(Baytelman, Iordanou & Constantinou, 2016; ; Barzilai & Eshet-Alkalai, 2015; Berland et al., 
2016; Jiménez-Aleixandre, 2014; McNeill et al., 2017; Ryu & Sandoval, 2012), particularly the 
ability to construct counterarguments (Iordanou, 2016b; Wu & Tsai, 2011; Zavala & Kuhn, 
2017), the relationship between epistemic beliefs and the types of arguments produced (diversity 
of arguments) has not been investigated yet. In order to develop a context which enables the 
construction of multiple types of arguments, we used SSI scenarios. Being complex, open-ended, 
contentious, cross-curricular dilemmas, with social, ethical, economic, scientific, ecological 
aspects, with no definitive answers, SSI scenarios are ideal candidates for the construction of 
different types of arguments (Lindahl, Folkesson & Zeidler, 2019; Sadler & Zeidler, 2005; 
Zeidler, Herman, Ruzek, Linder. & Lin, 2013).  
We hypothesize that students holding evaluative epistemic beliefs have the ability not 
only to evaluate different given arguments but also to produce different types of arguments, 
reflecting their ability to think about a complex issue from multiple perspectives. We also 
hypothesize that students with more robust prior knowledge will produce more arguments 
(Means & Voss, 1996), arguments of better quality (Iordanou & Constantinou, 2015; Grooms, 
Sampson, & Enderle, 2018; Osborne et al., 2016) and diversity. In particular, we hypothesize 
that prior knowledge will be related to the ability of constructing different types of arguments, 
given the relationship that has been reported between argument skills and prior knowledge (Zohar 
& Nemet, 2002), particularly between producing counterarguments and prior knowledge (Voss, 
Blais, Means, Greene & Ahwesh, 1986). 
To answer our research questions, we asked university students to construct social, 
ethical, economic, scientific and ecological arguments about SSIs and to complete instruments 
that assess their epistemic beliefs and prior knowledge on SSIs. We used three different SSI-
scenarios to investigate further whether the topic context has an effect on students’ ability to 
construct different types of arguments, examining whether the ability to construct different types 






Participants were 243 undergraduate students in Education at a public University in South 
Europe. 93% were females and 7% were males, with an overall mean age of 21 (SD = 1.5). The 
collection of data in an almost female only sample was not a choice but a limitation of this study, 
a constraint imposed by the student population of this University. Students were between the 
second and fourth year of their study. All participants were elementary or early childhood 
education majors and were enrolled in a required science education course. Participation in the 
research was optional. The students were recruited through advertisements and were 
compensated for their participation with a small bonus mark of 3% on the science education 
course. All students who expressed interest to participate in this study were accepted. The 
participants were Caucasian native speakers of Greek and shared a homogeneous middle-class 
social background and Greek language. There were no bilingual learners. With very few 
exceptions, all participants had completed their secondary education in public schools. However, 
they were from a diverse school subject background; some of them were specialized in Physics, 
others in Mathematics and others in Greek literature or Economics. Entrance to this university is 
competitive and it is based on participants’ performance in a national matriculation examination. 
All materials and assessment tools which were used for this study were in Greek language.  
 
Materials and Coding 
Socio-scientific issue scenarios.  
Three different SSI-dilemmas were developed and used in the present study. The first 
SSI-dilemma was on Usage or not usage of vaccines against the NUEVO flu virus. The second 
SSI-dilemma was on Consumption of bottled vs. tap water. The third SSI-dilemma was on Usage 
of underground vs. overhead high voltage lines in residential areas. Our rationale for the choice 
of these SSI-dilemmas is the following: (a) During the last decade, SSIs such as safety and  usage 
of vaccines, high voltage lines and consumption of bottled vs. tap water have attracted increasing 
attention in XXX, therefore students might have been more motivated to engage in thinking about 
these topics; (b) the participants of this study had already learned about vaccines, drinking water 
and high voltage lines in their science classes at secondary school and they had basic prior 
knowledge regarding these issues; and (c) the three different SSI-scenarios all have different 
scientific, social, economic, ecological and ethical aspects. 
Each SSI-scenario was presented on one A4 sheet of paper. The first text comprised 194 
words, the second 152 words and the third 169 words (in original version, in XXXX language). 
All three texts were developed by the authors and contained conflicting information, presenting 
different views on the dilemma presented in each scenario. Each of the three scenarios/texts was 
organized into four parts: the first part was a neutral introduction to the SSI-dilemma; the second 
part introduced one position of the dilemma; the third part presented the opposing position of the 
dilemma, the fourth part asked the students  to make an informed decision regarding each SSI. 
Both positions were supported by extra evidence (on a separate sheet) and were introduced in a 
balanced manner in relation to the aspects examined. A variety of sources were used for the 
additional evidence, such as official websites of relevant government agencies, articles in 
scientific and professional journals and magazines, online conference presentations, professional 
blogs, websites of advocacy groups, laypeople’s and non-experts’ opinions, newspaper articles, 
and teaching resources. The sequence of information on different positions as presented on the 
leaflets was reviewed by three expert researchers to make sure that it was balanced with respect 
to the two positions and would not bias the results of the study. 
We included three different SSI-scenarios to limit the possible context dependence and 
increase the generalizability of our results. Each text and corresponding evidence were printed 
on separate sheets of paper (see Appendices A and B) and were presented to the participants to 
be used in their efforts to construct arguments. Because of time constraints, participants were 
randomly assigned to three equal groups (N = 81) to complete one of the three SSIs, rather than 
all three of them. We investigated the effect of context on the construction of different types of 
arguments using dummy variables after controlling for topic prior knowledge and epistemic 
beliefs.  
Epistemic beliefs measures. 
To assess participants’ epistemic beliefs, we used the Dimensions of Epistemological Beliefs 
toward Science Instrument (DEBS) (Baytelman & Constantinou, 2016). The DEBS instrument 
focuses on the nature and characteristics of epistemic beliefs (epistemic dimensions) and is the 
only multidimensional instrument that has been validated in the particular culture that the 
research was conducted. The 30-item DEBS Instrument captures three dimensions concerning 
knowledge - certainty of knowledge, simplicity of knowledge and development of knowledge - 
and two dimensions concerning knowing - source of knowledge and justification of knowledge. 
Each dimension consisted of six items and the items were rated on a four-point Likert-scale, 
ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (4). High scores on this measure represent 
more sophisticated beliefs, while low scores represent less sophisticated beliefs. In the present 
research, the face and content validity of the DEBS Instrument was established by the input of 
two experts in Epistemic Cognition and two experts in Science Education (Baytelman & 
Constantinou, 2016). The internal consistency of each subscale of the instrument was examined 
using the Cronbach alpha coefficient. The construct validity of the instrument was examined with 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) using SPSS Amos 20.0, which indicates the underlying 
hypothesized factor structure based on the theoretical framework (see Appendix C). Table 1 
displays examples of items of each subscale of the DEBS Instrument, the item-rest correlation 




The confirmatory factor analyses confirmed our hypothesized dimensions, with the fit 
indices showing a reasonably good fit between the five-dimensional model and the data. 
Particularly, in our analyses, we used five fit indices with different measurement properties, 
following recommendations in the literature (Griffin, 2005; Hu & Bentler, 1999). Specifically, 
the fit indices with recommended values that we used in our study are: the chi squared difference 
test (x2/df) ˂ 2., Goodness-of-Fit Index (GFI), Comparative Fit Index (CFI) and Incremental Fit 
Index (IFI) ˃ 0.90, and Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) ≤ .08.  
The chi-squared difference test indicates the difference between observed and expected 
covariance matrices. GFI is a measure of fit between the hypothesized model and the observed 
covariance matrix. CFI and IFI analyze the model fit by examining the discrepancy between the 
data and the hypothesized model. RMSEA avoids issues of sample size by analyzing the 
discrepancy between the hypothesized model, with optimally chosen parameter estimates, and 
the population covariance matrix. According to Hu and Bentler (1999), a chi squared difference 
test χ2/df value less than 3.0 (Watkins, 1989), Goodness-of- Fit Index  (GFI), Comparative Fit 
Index (CFI), Incremental fit index (IFI) values greater than 0.90 (Brown, 2006) and a Root Mean 
Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) value less than .06 indicate a model with a good fit. 
CFI values close to or greater than 0.95 indicate an excellent fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999). Values of 
RMSEA ≤ 0.08 are often considered as indicating acceptable fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999).  




Prior knowledge measures. 
In the present study, prior knowledge is defined as domain-specific content knowledge, 
including knowledge of concepts, principles, facts and theories of a subject, but also an 
understanding of how those concepts and principles are organized (Kleickmann et al., 2012; 
Shulman, 1986).  One method for assessing a single concept or principle is the use of concept 
questions (Mazur, 1997). For assessing the organization and structure of an individual’s 
knowledge within a particular domain and the efficiency with which the knowledge can be used, 
Williams (1998) suggested using concept maps. Concept maps are a direct method of looking at 
the organization and structure of an individual’s knowledge within a particular domain and at the 
fluency and efficiency with which the knowledge can be used (Novak, 1998; 2006; 2010; Novak 
& Cañas, 2008).  
To assess their prior knowledge, students were asked to answer five open-ended questions 
and to construct a concept map for each SSI. We evaluated prior knowledge in two different 
levels: 1) shallow (surface) conceptual understanding, which was assessed by open-ended 
questions that examined distinct basic scientific concepts related to each SSI; and, 2) deep 
conceptual understanding, which was assessed by a concept map requiring appropriate 
relationships between the relevant concepts. Designing concept maps has been described as an 
appropriate approach to identify students’ mental representations because it reveals students’ 
understanding of how concepts and principles of a subject are organized and interrelated (Novak, 
1998; 2006; 2010; Novak & Cañas, 2008; Yin, Vanides,  Ruiz-Primo, Ayala, & Shavelson, 
2005). A concept map can provide evidence for the important distinction between deep and 
surface learning (Hay, 2007; Novak, 1998). The structure of a concept map is defined by the 
number of nodes and the relations between the nodes (e.g., organizational as in hierarchical 
concept maps vs. relational as in network concept maps). The more valid connections appearing 
among facts, ideas, and procedures, the better the understanding is (Hiebert & Carpenter, 1992; 
Hiebert & Lefevre, 1986). Concept maps can be used for distinguishing between deep and surface 
understanding, because concept maps help students reveal how they organize the concepts in 
their minds and the connections they make across topics (Hay, 2007). Additionally they can be 
used for distinguishing between meaningful and rote learning “because [concepts that are learnt 
by rote] are stored arbitrarily and non-substantively in cognitive structure, [therefore they] cannot 
be recalled and confer interference with new, related learning and recall of related information” 
(Novak, 1998).  
For the development of the prior knowledge questionnaires, four steps were followed: (a) 
Review of relevant literature for the development of a preliminary item pool; (b) Interviews with 
two experts in Science Education for the validation and optimization of items; (c) Pilot studies 
for determining the internal consistency and item analysis; and, (d) Preliminary data analyses. 
The open-ended questions were scored from 0 to 2 on the basis of their correctness and 
completeness by the first author and an independent judge. Cohen’s Kappa values are reported 
below. A zero-score meant that a completely false answer was given. A score of one meant that 
a semi-correct or incomplete answer was given, and a score of two meant that a fully correct and 
complete answer was given. No responses were treated as non-responses and were excluded from 
the analysis. The content of the items referred to core concepts of each SSI. Sample items are 
given in Appendix D. For the prior knowledge instrument during the pilot test, an inter-rater 
reliability process was conducted by the first author and an independent judge using 30% of the 
tests. Reliability was estimated using Cohen΄s Kappa with all disagreements resolved by 




Before the concept map task began, a short introduction to concept mapping was given 
to the students to ensure that all participants were familiar with this instrument. This decision 
was taken because, during the pilot study, some students did not know how to create a concept 
map. In particular, they were shown how concepts can be arranged graphically in a network in 
order to construct visual representations of their knowledge and understanding. They were taught 
to link all the concepts that they could (with arrows indicating the direction in which a link was 
to be read), and to label these links with statements that explained their interaction. Additionally, 
the participants were encouraged to follow five steps for the construction of their concept maps: 
(a) place the main concept at the top or the centre of the map, (b) organize the words (concepts) 
from most general to most specific, (c) use a linking word (verb, preposition, or short phrase) to 
connect and illustrate the relationship between the different concepts, (d) use crosslinks to make 
connections between concepts in different parts of the map, if needed, and (e) when finished, 
take a few moments to reflect on the map and modify it, if needed. Also, we emphasized the 
importance of developing maximum linkages as the best exposition of rich understanding.  
The students were asked to use a list of ten concepts relevant to each SSI, which were 
provided to them, in order to create a network concept map, describing the appropriate 
relationships between the relevant concepts. We decided to use a list of ten basic concepts for the 
construction of each SSI-concept map because in this way all participants had available some 
relevant background knowledge that they could use if they wished. Participants differed in the 
number of concepts they used, from 0 to 10. Using a scoring system already reported in the 
literature (Kyza, Constantinou, & Spanoudis, 2011; Yin et al., 2005), we counted the number of 
appropriate concepts and the number and quality of appropriate relationships between concepts 
(propositions) for each student’s concept map. Appendix E includes the levels that were used to 
score the propositions, examples of how the scoring system has been applied to score students’ 
concept maps, and three illustrative examples.  
For the open-ended questions and the concept maps, 30% of the data from each 
instrument and each of the three SSIs were coded by an independent judge. Inter-rater reliability 
for open-ended questions was estimated using Cohen΄s Kappa as follows: 
For SSI-1 question 1: k = .92; for question 2: k = .90; for question: 3: k = .89, for question 
4: k = 91; for question 5: k = .93. For the concept mapping Cohens’ kappa was calculated as k = 
.90. All disagreements were resolved through discussion between the two coders.  
For SSI-2 question 1: k = .90; for question 2: k = .90; for question: 3: k = .89, for question 
4: k = .91; for question 5: k = .90, and for the concept mapping k = .89, with all disagreements 
resolved after discussion between the two coders.  
For SSI-3 question 1: k = .89; for question 2: k = .92; for question: 3: k = .90, for question 
4: k = .91; for question 5: k = .88, and for the concept mapping k = .88, again with all 
disagreements resolved after discussion between the two coders. After establishing a satisfactory 
percentage of agreement between the two coders, 90%, the first author coded the remaining tests.  
 
Argument construction. 
Students’ individual argument skills were assessed using a written instrument based on 
published work (Kuhn, Goh, Iordanou, & Shaenfield, 2008; Wu & Tsai 2011). In particular, 
students were asked to take a position for each topic-dilemma and justify it by formulating 
supportive arguments, counterarguments and rebuttals. Students were prompted to construct 
different types of arguments, social, ethical, economic, scientific and ecological, expressing their 
opinion, by providing a particular space in the instrument for each type of argument. The 
instrument used for SSI 2 is presented in Appendix F. We asked for supportive arguments, 
counterarguments and rebuttals because, according to Nussbaum and colleagues (2008) and 
Naess (1966), arguments should be analyzed by examining the reasons in support of a conclusion 
(supportive arguments), and those supporting the opposite conclusion (counterarguments). 
Counterarguments can also show why a supportive argument is weak or flawed. Such arguments 
have also been referred to as refutations, undercutting defeaters, or counter-counterarguments. 
Although there is no consensus on how various authors use these terms, we adopted the approach 
of Kuhn (1991) who used the term rebuttal to refer to an argument refuting a counterargument 
(i.e., a counterargument to a counterargument).  
Since we are interested in the construction of different types of arguments and not 
argumentation per se, the students had to list their different types of arguments instead of writing 
one coherent text weighing and synthesizing strategies (argument–counterargument integration, 
see Nussbaum et al., 2008).  For example, for the topic of whether vaccines are safe and should 
be used against the NUEVO flu virus, students were asked to answer the following questions: 1. 
Are you for or against vaccination for the NUEVO flu virus? 2. If you want to convince a friend 
about your position, what arguments will you put forward to convince them? 3. If somebody 
holds an opposite position from yours on this issue, what arguments may he/she have? 4. 
According to the argument you mentioned in question 3, can you write down your opposite 
arguments to justify your position? (See Appendix F) 
For each participant, we computed the total number and assessed the quality of valid 
supportive arguments, counterarguments and rebuttals constructed, as well as the diversity of the 
different types of arguments - social, ethical, economic, scientific and ecological - as presented 
in Appendix G. Additionally, in Appendix G further explanation of the nature of the different 
types of arguments is given. A supportive argument, counterargument and rebuttal was 
considered valid if it involved the presentation of a claim and the legitimacy of that claim was 
documented through justification based on evidence. The quality of supportive arguments, 
counterarguments and rebuttals was determined based on a scoring scheme adapted from Sadler 
and Fowler (2006). The coding scheme took into consideration the number and accuracy of the 
pieces of evidence that were provided to support a claim. Thus, arguments that involved many 
pieces of valid and reliable evidence were considered to be stronger than arguments with only 
one piece of evidence (Sadler & Fowler, 2006). The quality of arguments produced was scored 
from 0 to 4, as presented in Table 4a.  
For coding the diversity of argument types, we followed two steps: (1) We checked the 
nature of each argument provided under each prompt for argument type in the instrument (see 
Appendix G), giving 1 point for each simple argument type. In this step, it was possible for one 
argument to be coded as a type other than the argument type in which the participant chose to 
register it under. (2) If there were multiple arguments provided under one prompt (e.g. an 
economic argument with elements of ethical or social considerations, which were not provided 
again in the space for ethical or social arguments), we coded them separately. A particular 
argument claim could only be classified into one type (e.g. economic). Complex arguments (e.g. 
economic and ethical) were classified for each claim separately. 
Tables 4a, 4b and 4c show examples of students’ arguments based on their quality, 





Inter-rater reliability was evaluated for the first author and an independent judge using a 
random sample of 30% of the tests for each SSI questionnaire. Reliability for quality was 
estimated at 92% (Cohens’ k = .92) while reliability for number of arguments was estimated at 
97% (Cohens’ k = .97) and for diversity of argument types at 92% (Cohens’ k = .92), with all 
disagreements resolved after discussion between the two coders. Following this, the first author 
coded the remaining tests. 
To examine whether epistemic beliefs (epistemic dimensions), prior knowledge (concept 
map and open-ended questions) and the SSI context can predict the number, quality and diversity 
of different types of arguments produced, multiple hierarchical regression analyses were carried 
out with the epistemic beliefs (epistemic dimensions), prior knowledge (concept map and open-
ended questions) and SSI context as predictors (see Appendix I for assumptions of regression 
analyses). The prior knowledge variables (concept map and open-ended questions) were entered 
in the first step, as the prior knowledge task was a kind of pre-task, while epistemic dimension 
variables were entered in the second step, and the dummy variables for SSI context in the third 
step.  
Pilot study. 
All instruments employed in this study were pilot tested, using a sample of undergraduate 
students, before refinement of the final versions. Participants in the pilot studies were education 
students at the same public University as the participants of the main study. None of the 
participants in any of the pilot studies took part in the main study. 
DEBS instrument. For the DEBS instrument, participants were 295 undergraduate 
students. The initial version of the DEBS instrument, before pilot testing, consisted of five 
subscales (dimensions) and 40 items. Initially, we asked 20 undergraduate students to provide 
feedback on the readability and perceived relevance of the items of the questionnaire. 
Additionally, we asked five other undergraduate students to rewrite all items in their own words. 
Based on the feedback we received in the pilot testing, we deleted or rewrote a number of items. 
The revised version of the instrument, consisting of five subscales and a total of 35 items, was 
further submitted to a large-scale validation procedure in order to establish the validity and 
internal consistency of the instrument. The instrument was further revised based on the findings 
of the validation processes, resulting in the final version, which consists of five subscales and 30 
items. 
Αrgument construction instrument. Initially, we provided 55 undergraduate students with 
the topic-dilemmas that were used in the present study, asking them to take a position for each 
topic-dilemma and justify it by formulating supportive arguments, counterarguments and 
rebuttals providing as many different types of arguments as they see fit. The results of this pilot 
study showed that the students produced only 1-2 types of arguments. Based on this finding, we 
decided to offer additional support to students, examining if students can produce different types 
of arguments when they are explicitly prompted to do so by providing them different category 
type prompts. Therefore, in the revised instrument we explicitly added different categories of 
types of arguments (social, ethical, economic, scientific, and ecological) and asked them to 
provide as many relevant arguments as possible, according to their opinion.   
Prior knowledge instrument. Initial versions of the instruments assessing participants’ 
prior knowledge for each SSI-topic, each consisting of six open-ended questions and a concept 
map, were pilot tested using a sample of 55 undergraduate students. Additionally, we asked 20 
undergraduate students to provide feedback on the readability and comprehension of the 
questions of the instruments, based on their prior knowledge. The mean scores for each of the six 
questions (average for the three SSIs) that were obtained in the pilot study of prior knowledge 
were the following MQ1 =1.38, MQ2 = 1.13, MQ3 = 1.27, MQ4 = 1.29, MQ5 = 1.35, MQ6 = 0.55. The 
results of this pilot study showed that the students had unacceptably low scores in one question 
of each instrument (MQ6 = 0.55). Based on the results of each open-ended question and the 
feedback from the 20 undergraduate students, we removed one item from each prior knowledge 
instrument, whose content was not adequately taught to the students. Furthermore, some items 
were rewritten in order to make the wording more precise. This procedure resulted in five open-
ended questions in the final version of each instrument.  
Main study. 
Each participant took part in 3 sessions. In the first session, lasting 20 minutes, the 
epistemic beliefs measure was administered. In the second session, which took place right after 
the first session and lasted 40 minutes, the prior knowledge instrument was administered. A 30-
minute break took place between the second and the third session. The order of tasks in the third 
session was as follows: (a) reading the SSI scenario on one of the three topics, (b) reading the 
SSI information related to the SSI scenario, and (c) constructing arguments. Students were given 
unlimited time to complete the tasks of the third session. This third session lasted from 40 to 60 
minutes. To obtain an adequate sample size, given the small number of registered students per 
semester at the University of Cyprus, the data collection was completed over five academic 
semesters in a period of 2.5 years. The first author conducted the data collection, which took 
place at the University of Cyprus. One participant was excluded from the analysis because he did 
not complete all tasks.  
Results 
To answer our research questions Pearson correlations were calculated in order to 
investigate if the variables of the study were positively or negatively and significantly correlated 
among them. Then, to answer whether epistemic beliefs, prior knowledge on SSI and SSI-context 
predict the quantity, quality and diversity of different types of arguments (supportive arguments 
- social, ethical, economic, scientific, ecological arguments - as well as counterarguments, and 
rebuttals) produced by university students, hierarchical multiple regression analyses were carried 
out. The multiple regression approach enables us to examine a relationship between a dependent 
variable and multiple independent variables.  
Preliminary Results 
The means, standard deviations, minimum and maximum scores, and values of skewness 




The measures of skewness and kurtosis indicated that all score distributions were 
approximately normal and, thus, appropriate for use in parametric statistical analyses. As seen in 
Table 5, participants’ scores on the epistemic beliefs measure suggested relatively sophisticated 
beliefs about certainty, justification and development of knowledge, and less sophisticated beliefs 
about simplicity (structure of knowledge) and source of knowledge. 
Table 6 displays the Pearson correlations between all variables for prior knowledge, 
epistemic beliefs and arguments construction of the current study. First, results of the Pearson 
correlation indicated that there was a relatively weak positive correlation (Cohen, 1988; 1992) 
between the concept map score and the open-ended questions score (r = 0.14, p ˂ 0.05), 
suggesting that the two measures of knowledge are not assessing exactly the same aspects. Open-
ended questions focus on a single concept, while a concept map focuses on the relational links 
between relevant concepts (Novak, 1998). Second, the Pearson correlation values indicated that 
there was a weak positive correlation between the prior knowledge concept map score (but not 
the open-ended questions score) and the simplicity dimension of knowledge, (r = 0.19, p ˂ 0.01), 
suggesting that more sophisticated epistemic beliefs (beliefs about the structure of knowledge) 
were correlated with high prior knowledge scores on the concept map.  
Third, results of Pearson correlation showed that there was a statistically significant 
correlation between the quantity, the quality and the diversity of different types of arguments on 
SSIs. In particular, there is a strong positive correlation between Quality of arguments and 
Number of arguments (r = 0.63, p ˂ 0.01), a moderate positive correlation between Diversity of 
arguments and Number of arguments (r = 0.41, p ˂ 0.01) and a moderate positive correlation 
between Quality of arguments and Diversity of arguments (r = 0.38, p ˂ 0.01). Additionally, 
results showed a significant weak positive correlation between the prior knowledge scores and 
the arguments that were constructed. More specifically, as seen in Table 6, there was a weak 
positive correlation between the arguments constructed ‒ quantity (r = 0.29, p ˂ 0.01), quality (r 
= 0.33, p ˂ 0.01), and diversity (r = 0.22, p ˂ 0.01) of different types of arguments ‒ and the prior 
knowledge scores (r = 0.25, p ˂ 0.01), the prior knowledge-concept map scores (r = 0.22, p ˂ 




Regarding epistemic beliefs and construction of arguments, we found that there was a 
significant weak positive correlation between the simplicity dimension and the quantity (r = 0.23, 
p ˂ 0.01), quality (r = 0.24, p ˂ 0.01) and diversity of different types of arguments (r = 0.31, p ˂ 
0.01). A weak positive correlation was also observed between the source beliefs dimension and 
the number of arguments (r = 0.17, p ˂ 0.01).  
Prior Knowledge, Epistemic Beliefs and Context as predictors of Argument Skills 
To answer the first research question, namely to examine the relationship between 
university students’ prior knowledge and epistemic beliefs and the number, quality and diversity 
of arguments they construct on a controversial socio-scientific topic, multiple regression analysis 
was conducted using prior knowledge (open-ended questions and concept map) and epistemic 
beliefs (epistemic dimensions according to the multidimensional perspective) as the predictor 
variables.  
        To answer the second research question, namely, to investigate the effects of the context of 
the three SSI-scenarios on the quantity, quality and diversity of different types of arguments 
produced, two dummy variables were created, which were related to the context of SSI-scenarios. 
The SSI 3: Usage of underground vs. overhead high voltage lines in residential areas was used 
as the reference category. The first dummy variable was SSI 1: Usage or not usage of vaccines 
against the NUEVO flu virus (vs SSI 3), while the second dummy variable was SSI 2: 
Consumption of bottled vs. tap water (vs SSI 3). 
Table 7 displays the unstandardized regression coefficients (B) and intercept, the 
standardized regression coefficients (β), R2 and adjusted R2 after entry of all independent 
variables (IVs).  
Table 7 
 
Quantity of Arguments 
After step 3, with all IVs in the equation, the model was statistically significant, R2 = .20, 
F(9,231) = 6.50, p ˂ 0.001. The adjusted R2 value of 0.18 indicates that 18% of the variability in 
the quantity of arguments is predicted by prior knowledge, epistemic beliefs and SSI-context.   
After step 1, with prior knowledge (concept map and open-ended questions) in the 
equation, R2 = .13, Finc(2, 238) = 17.21, p ˂ 0.001. The adjusted R2 value of 0.12 indicates that 
12% of the variability in the quantity of arguments is predicted by prior knowledge. After step 2, 
with the addition of epistemic beliefs (Certainty, Simplicity, Source, Justification and 
Development of Knowledge) to the prediction of quantity of arguments by prior knowledge, R2 
= .17, Finc(5,235) = 2.48, p ˂ 0.01. The adjusted R2 value of 0.15 indicates that 15% of the 
variability in the quantity of arguments is predicted by prior knowledge and epistemic beliefs. 
Addition of epistemic beliefs to the equation of prior knowledge results in a significant increment 
in R2  by 0.04. After step 3, with SSI-context added to prediction of quantity of arguments by 
prior knowledge and epistemic beliefs, R2 = .20, Finc(2,238) = 4.56,  p ˂ 0.01. The adjusted R2 
value of 0.18 indicates that 18% of the variability in the quantity of arguments is predicted by 
prior knowledge and epistemic beliefs. Addition of SSI-context to the equation improved R2 by 
0.03. The pattern of results suggests that 12% of the variability in the quantity of arguments 
constructed is predicted by prior knowledge. Epistemic beliefs contribute modestly to that 
prediction; SSI-context adds further to that prediction. 
 
Quality of Arguments 
After step 3, with all IVs in the equation R2 = 0.19, F(9,231) = 5.96,  p ˂ 0 .001. The 
adjusted R2 value of 0.15 indicates that 15% of the variability in the quality of arguments is 
predicted by prior knowledge, epistemic beliefs and SSI-context.   
After step 1, with prior knowledge (concept map and open-ended questions) in the 
equation, R2 = .14 Finc (2, 238) = 18.98, p ˂ 0 .001. The adjusted R2 value of 0.13 indicates that 
13% of the variability in the quality of arguments is predicted by prior knowledge. After step 2, 
with the addition of epistemic beliefs (Certainty, Simplicity, Source, Justification and 
Development of Knowledge) to the prediction of quality of arguments by prior knowledge, R2 = 
.18, Finc(5,235) = 2.25, p = 0.04. The adjusted R2 value of 0.16 indicates that 16% of the 
variability in the quality of arguments is predicted by prior knowledge and epistemic beliefs. 
Addition of epistemic beliefs to the equation of prior knowledge results in a significant increment 
in R2 by 0.04.  After step 3, with SSI-context added to prediction of quality of arguments by prior 
knowledge and epistemic beliefs, R2 = .19, Finc(2,238) = 0.83,  p = 0.44.  The adjusted R2 value 
of 0.15 indicates that 15% of the variability in the quality of arguments is predicted by prior 
knowledge, epistemic beliefs and SSI-context. The pattern of results suggests that 13% of the 
variability in the quality of arguments constructed is predicted by prior knowledge. Epistemic 
beliefs contribute modestly to that prediction by 0.006. Addition of SSI-context to the equation 
did not significantly improve R2. 
 
Diversity of Arguments 
After step 3, with all IVs in the equation R2 = .19, F(9,231) = 5.96,  p ˂ 0 .001. The 
adjusted R2 value of 0.16 indicates that 16% of the variability in the diversity of arguments is 
predicted by prior knowledge, epistemic beliefs and SSI-context.   
After step 1, with prior knowledge (concept map and open-ended questions) in the 
equation, R2 = .05 Finc(2, 238) = 6.07, p ˂ 0.01. The adjusted R2 value of 0.04 indicates that 4% 
of the variability in the diversity of arguments is predicted by prior knowledge. After step 2, with 
the addition of epistemic beliefs (Certainty, Simplicity, Source, Justification and Development 
of Knowledge) to the prediction of diversity of arguments by prior knowledge, R2 = .17, 
Finc(5,235) = 6.87, p ˂ 0 .001. The adjusted R2 value of 0.15 indicates that 15% of the variability 
in the diversity of arguments is predicted by prior knowledge and epistemic beliefs. Addition of 
epistemic beliefs to the equation of prior knowledge results in a significant increment in R2 by 
0.12. After step 3, with SSI-context added to prediction of diversity of arguments by prior 
knowledge and epistemic beliefs, R2 = .19, Finc(2,238) = 2.51,  p = 0.08.  The adjusted R2 value 
of 0.16 indicates that 16% of the variability in the diversity of arguments is predicted by prior 
knowledge and epistemic beliefs. Addition of SSI-context to the equation did not significantly 
improve R2.  The pattern of results suggests that 5% of the variability in the diversity of arguments 
constructed is predicted by prior knowledge. Epistemic beliefs contribute to that prediction; 
Addition of SSI-context to the equation did not significantly improve R2. 
 
Table 8 displays the Pearson correlations between epistemic beliefs variables and 
different types of arguments. As seen in Table 8, there was a weak positive correlation between 
the simplicity dimension and the number of ethical (r = 0.24, p ˂ 0.01), economic, (r = 0.18, p ˂ 
0.01) and scientific (r = 0.26, p ˂ 0.01) arguments. 
Table 8 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
The aim of the present study was to investigate possible relationships between epistemic 
beliefs, prior knowledge, and construction of different types of arguments on socio-scientific 
issues (SSIs). We examined whether prior knowledge (concept map and open-ended questions), 
epistemic beliefs (epistemic dimensions) and SSI-context predict the quantity, quality and 
diversity of different types of arguments (supportive arguments - social, ethical, economic, 
scientific, ecological - counterarguments and rebuttals) constructed by university students on one 
of three complex controversial, socio-scientific topics. We start with discussing our findings from 
the correlations among the variables that we examined and then we proceed with discussing the 
major findings regarding how prior knowledge, epistemic beliefs and SSI-context predict 
students’ argument skills.  
The results of the present study demonstrate an association between prior topic 
knowledge and the number as well as the quality of arguments produced on a complex SSI. This 
finding is in line with previous research showing that topic knowledge is essential for the 
construction of more than one arguments on a socio-scientific topic (Means & Voss, 1996; Mason 
& Scirica, 2006; Sadler & Fowler, 2006) and for the construction of high quality arguments 
(Mason & Scirica, 2006; Osborne et al., 2016; Sadler & Fowler, 2006; Wu & Tsai, 2011). Our 
findings extend the current literature by showing that robust prior topic knowledge is essential 
not only for the quantity and quality of arguments but also for the diversity of different types of 
arguments that students construct, in their effort to take under consideration multiple sides and 
perspectives of a socio-scientific topic. This finding is revealing of the important role of prior 
topic knowledge on scientific creativity, at least in relation to the facility to generate alternative 
arguments and interpretations (Sawyer, 2012). 
Regarding the relationship between prior knowledge and epistemic beliefs, our results 
demonstrate an association between epistemic beliefs, particularly beliefs about the structure of 
knowledge, and depth of prior knowledge, when the latter was assessed through concept mapping 
(Hiebert & Carpenter, 1992; Hiebert & Lefevre, 1986), but not with prior knowledge of isolated 
scientific concepts, which was assessed by open-ended questions (Hiebert & Carpenter, 1992; 
Hiebert & Lefevre, 1986) related to a SSI. This finding is in line with previous research 
suggesting that epistemic beliefs may limit or promote conceptual change and topic conceptual 
understanding (Amin, Smith & Wiser, 2014; Stathopoulou & Vosniadou, 2007a; 2007b; Trevors, 
Kendeou et al., 2017; Trevors, Muis et al., 2017). For example, students who think science 
involves only description of facts may be more likely to focus on isolated phenomena. On the 
other hand, those who think science is more complex and involves interrelated concepts and 
justifications, are more likely to rely on multiple sources and tend to look for organizing 
principles and patterns of relationships, achieving therefore deeper conceptual understanding. 
Another interpretation for this finding is that less sophisticated epistemic beliefs about the 
structure of knowledge (i.e. beliefs in simple knowledge with discrete pieces of factual 
information) may activate one’s goal to memorize information, which elicits superficial 
processing strategies such as rote rehearsal (Ioannou & Iordanou, 2019). In contrast, epistemic 
beliefs in complex knowledge (sophisticated simplicity beliefs) may activate one’s goal to 
understand the available information and develop coherent conceptualizations, eliciting deeper 
processing strategies (e.g. making connections, integrating ideas, creating concept maps) or 
considering a SSI from multiple perspectives and alternative viewpoints. From this perspective, 
the relationship between epistemic beliefs and conceptual understanding is likely to be reciprocal 
to some degree (Pintrich, 2002). Since personally held beliefs about scientific knowledge and 
knowing are themselves subject to change, it is rather reasonable to suggest that deeper 
understanding of a knowledge domain may provide feedback that influences epistemic beliefs 
(Chinn & Duncan, 2018). 
Turning now to the major findings of the present study, our results indicate that prior 
knowledge (as assessed by a concept map and open-ended questions) and the epistemic 
dimension of simplicity of knowledge (beliefs about the structure of knowledge) have significant 
predictive power for the quantity, the quality and the diversity of different types of the arguments 
(supportive arguments - social, ethical, economic, scientific, ecological - counterarguments and 
rebuttals) that university students construct on a complex, controversial, socio-scientific topic. 
Our results further show that the SSI-context has a significant predictive power for the quantity 
of arguments that student construct, but not for the quality or the diversity of the arguments.  
The finding that prior knowledge and epistemic beliefs predict the quantity and quality 
of arguments is consistent with previous findings reported in the literature, as discussed above 
(Iordanou, Kendeou, & Beker, 2016; Iordanou & Constantinou, 2015; Mason & Scirica, 2006; 
Sadler & Fowler, 2006; Wu & Tsai, 2011). Yet, the finding that epistemic beliefs and prior 
knowledge predict the diversity of different types of arguments that students construct constitutes 
a novel contribution of the present study. This finding provides insight into our understanding 
for the development of a theoretical framework for dealing with controversial SSIs, suggesting 
that students need deep topic conceptual understanding and an epistemic understanding 
theorizing knowledge as a complex system of organized theoretical principles and ideas 
(sophisticated simplicity epistemic beliefs) for dealing effectively with complex controversial 
SSIs. Sufficiently developed content knowledge and epistemic understanding enabled students 
in the present study to appreciate the complexity and multidimensionality of SSIs, as was 
reflected in students’ ability to produce arguments from multiple perspectives. We argue that 
robust prior knowledge is necessary for the construction of different types of arguments because 
students must have a well-developed conceptual schema in order to incorporate content 
knowledge in their different types of arguments (Sadler & Fowler, 2006; Sadler & Zeidler, 2005).  
The finding that sophisticated simplicity epistemic beliefs predicted the diversity of 
arguments produced on SSIs, above and beyond prior knowledge is of particular importance, 
highlighting the role of epistemic beliefs in particular, for constructing different types of 
arguments on a SSI. A possible explanation for this finding that epistemic simplicity beliefs 
predicted construction of different types of arguments (diversity of arguments), mainly 
arguments about the ethical, economic and scientific aspects of a SSI, is the following: Students 
who view knowledge as a collection of simple and discrete pieces of factual information (naïve 
simplicity beliefs), rather than as a complex system of organized theoretical concepts 
(sophisticated simplicity beliefs), may tend not to: 1) develop an understanding of the complex 
controversial nature of a socio-scientific topic; 2) consider alternative views, and/or 3) recognize 
that some aspects of an issue have more and different implications as well as ethical dimensions. 
Additionally, if students believe that knowledge is simple, they probably do not appreciate the 
need to include different evidence and diverse perspectives in their arguments, or the need to 
seek further evidence or to integrate conflicting information from multiple sources. The finding 
that only the simplicity dimension of the multidimensional approach was associated with 
argument skills could be explained taking into consideration that the multidimensional model of 
personal epistemic beliefs is a system of rather orthogonal, uncoordinated dimensions, that are 
more or less independent, not necessarily developing in synchrony with each other (Iordanou, 
2016a; Muis et al., 2015). Muis et al. (2015) also argued that it is often the case that only one or 
two dimensions of the multidimensional model are particularly salient in a learning situation. In 
the present study, students were presented with a complex SSI for which connections among 
different pieces of information, perspectives and evidence were necessary, which probably made 
the simplicity dimension - about the structure of knowledge - more salient than the other 
epistemic dimensions.  
In summary, the present study extends the current literature examining relationships 
between epistemic beliefs, prior knowledge and the construction of different types of arguments 
on complex controversial socio-scientific issues (SSIs). The findings of the present study show 
that students with relatively sophisticated simplicity beliefs and relatively robust prior topic 
knowledge construct not only more arguments, counterarguments and rebuttals, of higher quality, 
but also different types of arguments (diversity of arguments), than students with non-
sophisticated simplicity beliefs and not robust prior topic knowledge. The former students 
constructed different types of arguments, mainly ethical, economic and scientific arguments, 
taking into consideration the complexity and multidimensionality of SSIs and avoiding over-
simplification of the issues.  
Some limitations of the current study that may give impetus to further work in this area 
are important to mention. The first limitation concerns the diversity of the sample. Although the 
issues addressed in the current study are of international applicability, we cannot generalize our 
results based on a relatively small sample, consisting of 93% female participants. A second 
limitation concerns the time span of the data collection of the study. The data collection was 
completed in a period of 2.5 years, due to the small number of students who enter the education 
program at the particular university that the data were collected. The third limitation concerns 
the type of the instrument that was employed to assess epistemic beliefs. We used only a single 
instrument, a questionnaire, which does not probe elaborated participants' responses to items as 
in-depth interviews would do. Future studies could usefully take a closer look at the interplay 
between epistemic beliefs and argument construction using a multiplicity of methods, such as 
interviews and think-aloud protocols (Iordanou, Muis, & Kendeou, 2019), but also a sample, at 
a particular time point, that would be balanced in terms of gender representation and age. A fourth 
limitation of this study is that only the refutation strategy was taken into account for the 
construction of arguments. Although the refutation strategy includes, to some extent, weighing 
and synthesizing strategies, other strategies, such as the integration strategy of the different 
confronting positions in an argument (Nussbaum & Schraw, 2007), could also have been directly 
examined. Also, given that many Pearson coefficients in the present study were rather low 
(ranging from 0.17 to 0.36) regarding the relationships between epistemic beliefs, prior 
knowledge and argument skills, and also the R squared in the stepwise regression analyses for 
explaining different types of arguments was less than 25%, further research is required to 
replicate these findings.  
Nevertheless, our study has important educational implications, showing that relatively 
sophisticated simplicity epistemic beliefs and robust conceptual understanding are related with 
an individuals’ argument skills, especially their ability to construct different types of arguments 
on SSIs, elucidating the complex and multidimensional nature of SSIs. Additionally, the finding 
of the present study that undergraduate education students’ epistemic beliefs and conceptual 
understanding are not optimally developed for dealing with SSIs, point to the need to invest on 
efforts fostering individuals’ epistemic beliefs, especially their simplicity beliefs, and conceptual 
understanding. We need to find ways for supporting what Barzilia and Chinn (2017) refer to as 
epistemic education for promoting apt epistemic performance.  
Engagement in dialogic argumentation might be a promising way for supporting both 
objectives, namely acquiring content knowledge (Asterhan & Schwarz, 2016; Iordanou & Kuhn, 
2019; Iordanou, Kuhn, Matos, Shi, & Hemberger, 2019) and developing evaluativist epistemic 
beliefs (Iordanou, 2016a; 2016b). Promoting teachers’ epistemic beliefs should be one of the 
major objectives of efforts aiming to promote young people’s argument skills. Iordanou  and 
Constantinou  (2014) have shown that engaging pre-service teachers in a program based on 
argumentative and reflective activities appears to be a promising pathway for supporting pre-
service teachers to develop their epistemic beliefs and their conceptual understanding. 
Engagement in dialogic argumentation on SSIs in particular, might further facilitate fostering 
individuals’ epistemic beliefs, since SSIs are complex open-ended problems, involving multiple 
aspects, approaches, perspectives, ethical considerations and conflicting information, all of 
societal relevance. In addition, prompting students to think of the different aspects involved in 
SSIs (social, ethical, economic, scientific, ecological, etc.) may support the development of 
students’ awareness of the complex nature of the SSIs, facilitating further the development of 
students’ epistemic simplicity beliefs. More research is required to examine this possibility. 
Future efforts also need to focus on finding the means for supporting the development of pre-
service teachers’ epistemic beliefs, particularly their epistemic simplicity beliefs, their 
understanding about the complexity and multidimensionality of SSIs and conceptual 
understanding. In doing so, we would empower pre-service teachers in their role later as teachers 
to foster the development of these forms of understandings among their future students, preparing 
them to function as responsible citizens in democratic  societies, which require citizens to 
consider and evaluate different aspects, perspectives and viewpoints on complex issues in order 
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